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This paper examines recent policy issues relating to foreign investment incentives in 
the regulatory domain. By ‘regulatory incentives’ in this context we mean those 
administrative conditions offered by governments to foreign firms other than special 
fiscal (e.g. tax) or financial (e.g. subsidies) treatment. The key issue addressed in this 
paper is whether competition between host countries for inward investment on the 
basis of their regulatory regimes has any effect on the level and ‘quality’ (technology, 
stability, employment etc) of that investment on the one hand. And on the other hand, 
whether such competition between countries leads to a welfare loss to that country 
and other OECD members or non-members. Section 2 examines the economic 
principles involved in the analysis of the impact of regulatory incentives on the 
investment decision of the international firm; where the predictability of future 
regulatory policy can be as significant to investment decisions as the particular 
standard enforced.  Section 3 explores three current issue areas in relation to 
regulatory incentives at the national level: (i) property rights and market access 
rules; (ii) environmental protection; and (iii) labour standards. Section 4 addresses 
the existing international codes and agreements that might provide an alternative to, 
or support for, national regulatory arrangements and overcome the co-ordination 
problem.  Section 5 concludes with some suggestions as to a possible agenda for 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper examines recent policy issues relating to foreign investment incentives in 
the regulatory domain.
1  By ‘regulatory incentives’ in this context we mean those 
administrative conditions offered by governments to foreign firms other than special 
fiscal (e.g. tax) or financial (e.g. subsidies) treatment.
2   The key issue addressed in 
this paper is whether competition between host countries for inward investment on the 
basis of their regulatory regimes has any effect on the level and ‘quality’ (technology, 
stability, employment etc) of that investment on the one hand. And on the other hand, 
whether such competition between countries leads to a welfare loss to that country 
and other OECD members or non-members.   
 
However, it should be kept in mind that although there exists a considerable literature 
about the impact of FDI on the environment and employment, there is much less on 
the impact of regulatory regimes on FDI and very little indeed on the existence of or 
the consequences of regulatory competition between countries.  Further there is a 
problem with the interpretation of statistical data relating regulatory standards to FDI.  
All regulatory standards – whether on property and competition, on environmental 
protection or on labour standards – tend to improve with a country’s income level. In 
addition, small countries are clearly in a weaker negotiating position with regard to 
large companies and large neighbours. Thus we would expect to see the incentive for 
a government to engage in regulatory competition to decline with both income and 
size. But income levels and market size are agreed to be the main attraction for FDI 
itself. So we would in fact expect to observe a statistical correlation between 
regulatory standards and inward FDI even if there were no causal connexion.   
 
This paper has three substantive sections. Section 2 examines the economic principles 
involved in the analysis of the impact of regulatory incentives on the investment 
decision of the international firm; where the predictability of future regulatory policy 
can be as significant to investment decisions as the particular standard enforced.  
Section 3 explores three current issue areas in relation to regulatory incentives at the 
national level: (i) property rights and market access rules; (ii) environmental 
protection; and (iii) labour standards. Section 4 addresses the existing international 
codes and agreements that might provide an alternative to, or support for, national 
regulatory arrangements and overcome the co-ordination problem.  Finally, Section 5 




2. REGULATORY INCENTIVES AND THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT DECISION 
 
Economic theory justifies public regulatory intervention in markets where these are 
absent, incomplete or inefficient. In practice, this can be seen as a requirement to: (i) 
ensure property rights; (ii) correct for economic externalities; and (iii) prevent abuse 
by monopolies. The first and third criteria provide the basis for strong regulatory 
disciplines that underpin property rights (extending from guarantees against 
expropriation to upholding patents) and ensure market access to all firms as well as 
protect consumers. In this situation, stronger regulatory regimes can be expected to 
attract foreign investment. The effect of reducing legal barriers to foreign ownership QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS80   Page 3 
   
is similar. However, it should be noted that national firms may enjoy protection from 
such measures and thus may consider themselves to be prejudiced by their removal.  
 
The second two criteria are widely agreed to justify government regulation in order to 
maintain minimum standards of labour conditions and environmental protection. A 
particular production process may impose environmental costs (deforestation, 
pollution etc) on the economy as a whole, and for future generations, that are not 
reflected in current profit levels for the firm. These environmental costs can be 
reduced by specific legal constraints intended to internalise these social externalities 
to the firm. In the case of labour, it is suggested that workers are in a weak bargaining 
position where they have few skills (and are in excess supply) or are geographically 
immobile in contrast to foreign investors who can shift between countries. By 
extension, any general reduction of these standards, or a concession in a particular 
case, could reduce production costs and thus constitute an incentive to invest in a 
specific country.
3 It would, however, impose costs on the rest of the economy and 
society.   
 
In the case of international investment projects, this principle is complicated by the 
asymmetric nature of international capital markets. Small, transition and developing 
countries – that is, all but the largest industrial economies which are also net capital 
exporters – experience an ‘excess demand for capital’ in the sense that their 
governments desire a level of foreign direct investment higher than that currently 
obtaining.
4  At the international level, this means that individual governments 
countries inevitably perceive the need to compete with other host countries for foreign 
investment by offering regulatory incentives in addition to tax breaks and state 
subsidies.  
 
Further, modern investment theory – see Dixit and Pindyck (1994) – holds that 
relatively modest levels of uncertainty about future costs of production will require 
much higher ‘hurdle rates of return’ than the borrowing rate of interest for the firm to 
take the investment decision. This occurs because of the irreversibility of investment 
decisions, which means that the present value of future returns must exceed not only 
the capital cost itself but also the loss of the ‘option value’ of postponing the 
investment – or that of locating elsewhere.  This is particularly true of uncertainty as 
to government policy on issues such as the environmental protection (op. cit. pp. 303-
9) and labour skilling (op. cit. pp. 294-6).  In consequence, regulatory standards that 
are regarded as predictable by investing firms will reduce uncertainty and increase the 
attractiveness of investment, even if they involve higher operating costs. This 
predictability can itself be derived from the legal or legislative process that supports 
them, which means they will not be applied arbitrarily; or from the fact that they are 
included in international agreements that are difficult to break.  
 
Multinational firms operate in a number of countries and the investment in question 
takes place in a ‘host’ country distinct from the ‘home’ country where the 
headquarters is usually located, and the bulk of the shareholders (that is the ‘beneficial 
interest’) reside. The evaluation of a particular overseas investment project by the 
headquarters planners will involve, therefore, consideration not only of the 
profitability of the subsidiary in question but also the impact of that investment on the 
profits and asset price of the group as a whole (or ‘shareholder value’). The regulatory 
regime in the host country can thus affect (positively or negatively) not only the QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS80   Page 4 
   
project return and risk, but also asset value of the group as a whole when a global 
brand image is affected and the sales of other group members suffer (or benefit). 
  
Regulatory standards thus have three distinct consequences for the investment 
decision.  First, the immediate impact on operating costs of higher (or lower) 
standards of wages, work conditions, social provisions etc on the one hand; and of 
higher (or lower) labour standards or environment protection. Second, the effect of 
uncertainty about future standards and property rights – where lower standards now 
may be replaced by the higher ones due to socio-economic progress and/or political 
pressure – which for irreversible investments can require considerably increased 
‘hurdle rates of return’ to invest in a particular country. Third, the influence on the 
asset value of the group as a whole due to the reaction of shareholders, consumers and 
employees in the ‘home’ country to group subsidiary operations abroad.   
 
In principle, the impact of regulatory incentives will thus vary by the type of firm and 
the sector of operations. Large international firms whose investment is based on 
technological leadership in a sector (such as telecommunications, banking or 
aerospace) will not have a cost base much affected by regulatory concessions on 
labour or environment. However, these firms may rely on patents and brand names 
and thus depend upon intellectual property rules. To the extent that they require a 
skilled labour force, the protection of unskilled labour does not present a problem: 
indeed, high labour standards may be a positive attraction to the extent that these are 
associated with public human capital investment. By extension, to the extent that 
company employees (especially international executives) prefer cities with good 
living standards, strong environmental protection can be an attraction factor. 
 
In consequence, even though firms producing (say) apparel or timber could respond 
positively to regulatory incentives because these would reduce production costs, they 
might be expected to avoid locating in those countries where these standards are 
notoriously low – or at least to make sure that their subsidiaries (and identifiable local 
suppliers) maintain reasonable standards.  To the extent that these firms are involved 
in long-term large investment projects – particularly in mining and energy – then they 
are more vulnerable to regulatory uncertainty. Thus the expectation that standards will 
not change in an unpredictable fashion can be a considerable incentive to invest.  
 
However, the same logic also means that international firms that are not subject to 
these pressures cannot logically be expected to behave in the same way. Multinational 
corporations whose asset value does not depend on a consumer brand image, or one 
where the shareholding is highly concentrated and privately held, will clearly not have 
a very strong incentive to apply high environmental or labour standards to their 
overseas subsidiaries or suppliers. Firms whose asset value is based on technology 
will clearly value patent protection more highly than those producing standard 
products with cheap labour. Firms whose investment horizon is long are more 
concerned about property protection; while exporters are less concerned by domestic 
market access than services firms highly dependent on local consumer protection 
rules.  
 
In sum, economic theory indicates that the impact of regulatory regimes – and thus 
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production sector and the ownership structure of the firm on the one hand, and the 




3. RECENT ISSUES IN RELATION TO REGULATORY INCENTIVES 
 
Property protection and market access  
The aspect of regulatory regimes of most direct concern to foreign investors is that 
related to the protection of corporate property and access to domestic markets. Indeed, 
this is the central topic of both the nearly two thousand bilateral investment treaties 
now in existence – a fourfold increase since 1990 (UNCTAD, 2001c: 6-7).
5 Further, 
during that period there has been a marked tendency for national investment regimes 
to become more favourable towards FDI.
6  These disciplines in turn have been 
included in regional arrangements such as NAFTA, and possibly would be included in 
multilateral agreements in the future.  
 
Strong standards of property protection can clearly encourage foreign investment: the 
debate concerns the question of whether domestic investors are advantaged or 
disadvantaged by these developments. At the most basic level, the fear of 
expropriation of fixed assets is still a problem for foreign investors in only a few 
transition and developing countries. A more relevant consequence of regulatory 
uncertainty is over patent rights, which affects the ‘quality of investment’ reflected on 
the technology transferred as part of affiliates’ activities or joint ventures.  A study of 
US firms operating in developing host countries in the early 1990s shows that both the 
composition and extent of US direct investment is influenced by patent rules, and that 
in many cases intellectual property protection is too weak to permit joint ventures 
with local partners (Mansfield, 1995).  Investment in R&D facilities is clearly much 
more sensitive than that in sales or distribution outlets, while some industries (such as 
pharmaceuticals) are more sensitive than others such as food processing or 
transportation equipment. Older technologies are transferred to countries with weak 
intellectual property protection.  Evidence for Japanese and German firms in 
developing countries indicates a similar pattern, with the strength or weakness of a 
country’s system of intellectual property protection seems to have a substantial effect 
in relatively high-technology industries (such as chemicals, pharmaceuticals, 
machinery and electrical equipment) on the kinds of technology transferred. 
 
Another dimension of property regulation with relevance of foreign investment is the 
widespread and large-scale privatisation of state-owned enterprises in both OECD and 
non-OECD member countries over the last two decades. This has fuelled the recent 
growth of FDI by ‘merger and acquisition’ in many countries, which has also been 
caused by the tendency of international firms to expand by ‘horizontal integration’ 
(that is conducting similar activities abroad) rather than ‘vertical integration’ 
(expanding upstream or downstream along the value chain). The withdrawal of public 
enterprises in fields such as utilities, banking and telecommunications has also 
generated much more competition and thus scope for entry by foreign firms. 
However, regulations for the newly privatised sectors – whether or consumer 
protection or prudential oversight – can lead to effective protection for established 
firms (Warner, 1996).   
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The empirical literature on the impact of private sector restrictive practices in 
discouraging inward FDI indicates that in only a few countries does this constitute a 
major problem (Noland, 1999). However, evidence is found of restrictive practice in 
retail distribution (e.g. the UK), bidding for public sector contracts (e.g. Japan), in 
airline ticketing (e.g. in the US) and quality standards (e.g. Korea); all of which 
inhibit inward investment. More important perhaps are the patterns of closed share 
ownership that means that local capital markets become an effective barrier to FDI 
through mergers and acquisitions – particularly in continental Europe and Japan. 
Although these impediments may arise as much from official regulatory rules as from 
informal restrictive practices, they imply a need to avoid pressures for re-regulation as 
a disguised form of restrictive practice (Graham & Richardson, 1997). 
 
Most WTO and other trade agreements limit or prohibit investment incentives in the 
form of subsidies. However, the TRIMs agreement (which relates to those aspects of 
FDI which impact on the trade in goods rather than services) prohibits regulatory 
measures that are inconsistent with national treatment and quantitative restrictions 
principles: in effect measures on local content and trade balancing which have been 
widespread in the past.
7  In consequence, there has been increased interest in recent 
years in the provision of positive incentives to FDI through “policies to strengthen 
linkages” that “raise the efficiency of production and contribute to the diffusion of 
knowledge and skills from the TNCs to the local enterprise sector” (UNCTAD, 
2001c: Chapter V), but are still consistent with WTO commitments on protection and 
subsidies. These ‘new investment policies’ relate to information provision, 
‘matchmaking’, technology upgrading and training for local firms. In the case of 
Singapore, Ireland, Wales, Malaysia and the Czech Republic these measures seem to 
have been remarkably effective in both attracting FDI and strengthening local 
linkages.   
 
Environmental protection 
In principle we would expect the downward pressure on standards to be most evident 
in the case where environmental regulation represents a significant part of costs (or 
restriction on investment) and where host countries are good substitute locations. The 
sectors that would seem to be potentially most vulnerable would thus be natural 
resource extraction (including the industrial use of water) and polluting manufacturing 
sectors such as chemicals, paper and metal processing.  However, against this must be 
set the fact that the main attractors for foreign investment are natural resource 
availability, large domestic markets and skilled labour pools. These attractors are 
geographically specific and thus reduce the ability of investors to move between 
economies. Major natural resource projects on the one hand, and modern non-traded 
service sectors (such as banking and utilities) on the other, thus offer less opportunity 
for investment mobility than industrial production.  
 
In view of the unavoidable environmental impact of large natural resource extraction 
projects and the frequency of foreign investor involvement, such contracts have 
always been negotiated on an ad hoc basis (including clean-up provisions) rather than 
being conducted under fixed national or international rules (Schrijver, 1997). Thus 
although there is no lack of evidence on the environmental impact of large mining and 
oil projects, due to their geographical specificity there is little regulatory competition 
between countries in this area because this would not be sufficient to shift investment. 
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modify environmental prohibitions on drilling in cases such as that of Alaska and on 
opencast mining in the UK.  By extension, there is most cause for concern where 
negotiations take place between large multinational investors and small non-OECD 
countries, where the royalty and tax income to the state (and possibly to its senior 
members) might override the environmental concerns of the majority of the 
population or of vulnerable social groups.   
 
In contrast, service sector investment does not usually have much environmental 
impact, and it could even be argued that the need to attract skilled technical and 
managerial staff gives environmentally attractive countries (more specifically regions 
or cities within them) a competitive edge in attracting banks, insurance companies and 
call centres. The fact that an increasing proportion of world-wide FDI is in the service 
sector is reassuring in this context: some 52 percent of the world inward FDI stock is 
in services (46 percent in 1988) as opposed to 6 percent in resource-based sectors and 
42 percent in the industrial sector. The shares are similar for developed and 
developing countries. 
 
Distribution of inward FDI Stock, 1999 






Total (US $ bn)  3633  2520  1015  98 
Primary (%)  5.5  5.7  5.4  2.5 
Secondary (%)  41.6  36.4  54.5  43.5 
Tertiary (%)  50.3  55.5  37.3  50.3 
Unspecified (%)  2.5  2.4  2.8  4.0 
Source:UNCTAD, 2001c: 259-60 
 
Much of the recent empirical research on regulatory competition has thus focussed on 
the location decisions of ‘dirty’ industries. Even in the case of heavy industry, there is 
little hard evidence of ‘pollution havens’ exercising a strong attraction in OECD 
countries (OECD 1999). International industrial competitiveness and environmental 
regulation do not appear to be directly linked.
8  Indeed, inward FDI to the US 
involves more pollution-intensive industries than outward FDI from the US, while 
‘dirty’ US industries are no more likely to invest abroad than other industries 
(Albrecht, 1998). 
 
A recent OECD Development Centre survey of empirical literature on ‘rule-based 
competition’ by governments to attract FDI (Oman, 2000) finds that what limited 
evidence exists suggests that “firms in modern manufacturing and service industries 
rarely move their operations to take advantage of lower environmental standards in 
another country, and that efforts by national governments to compete for FDI in these 
industries through lax standards or lax enforcement of environmental protection are 
unlikely to be unsuccessful.” In contrast, the World Bank (2001) suggests that the 
effect of trade liberalisation and associated foreign investment inflows has had a 
mixed effect on the environment in non-OECD countries. One the one hand, more 
efficient energy use due to price adjustment (especially in Eastern Europe) has 
reduced carbon pollution; but on the other hand, scale and composition effects lead to 
more ‘dirty’ industries expanding (Beghin and Poitier, 1997). The World Bank cites 
evidence that this has indeed happened in Indonesia, China, Costa Rica and Turkey.  
French and US FDI flows to manufacturing in the Ivory Coast, Mexico, Morocco and QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS80   Page 8 
   
Venezuela appear to have no pollution-intensive bias (Eskland & Harrison, 1997); but 
Xing & Kolstad (1995 cited in World Bank op. cit.) find that US FDI in chemical 
industries seems to be to be influenced by weak environmental regulation, but not in 
cleaner industries.  
 
Evidence based on interviewing multinational firms about their decisions on location 
of plant within countries suggests that looser regulation does have an attractive effect 
(UNCTAD, 1993); although this effect appears to be weak within more advanced 
ones such as the US (Levinson 1997).  Where OECD pollution-intensive industries do 
shift, it is usually to other OECD countries: the worst offenders are often non-OECD 
based firms. This may be because larger OECD-based firms tend to apply uniform 
standards on their subsidiaries, which then match those in the home country 
(UNCTAD 1993, 2001a). None the less, there is good reason to believe that in fact 
many of the smaller OECD and non-OECD governments are constrained from raising 
their standards by fear of loss of attractiveness to foreign investment.   
 
Labour standards 
Unlike the situation in property and environmental protection discussed above, there 
do exist internationally agreed norms on labour standards. These are included in 
declarations aimed at protecting the human and labour rights ranging from the 
Universal Declaration on Human Rights to the protocols drawn up by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO, 1991). These refer to ‘core’ labour standards 
such as the right of association or the prohibition of slave and child labour. They do 
not relate to wage levels, working conditions or contractual forms.  
 
Competition for inward investment on the basis of flexibility of employment contracts 
and reduced non-wage labour costs has characterised the OECD economies (and 
states’ policies within the USA) for some decades. Similar competition in the sphere 
of labour regulation has emerged more recently in Europe, but it is due to firms’ 
desire for flexibility when reorganising production rather than the search for low 
wages or working conditions as such. This has led to both the establishment of the EU 
Social Charter in order to prevent ‘social dumping’ and the de facto move towards 
shorter employment contracts and reduced social security costs at the national level. 
However, the implementation of ILO core labour standards is not in question as these 
are considerably lower than the minimum standards established in national law by 
OECD members. 
 
The most vulnerable sectors for potential lowering of labour standards (in the ILO 
sense) are thus in developing countries, which are intensive in low-skill employment 
and attempt to attract ‘footloose’ industries such as textiles and clothing. The 
strongest evidence for regulatory competition is probably the establishment of ‘free 
trade zones’ (FTZs) that attract light industry such as electronics, clothing and 
footwear (ILO 1998). In addition to tax incentives and subsidised infrastructure, 
labour regulations are generally less stringent, allowing flexibility in piece-rates and 
employment contracts. Environmental regulation – particularly in the disposal of 
pollutants – also appears also to be lax in many FTZs. By definition, therefore, 
foreign investors in these zones receive ‘better than national treatment’ although in 
practice there is little to prevent a domestic firm from investing in an FTZ in its own 
country through an overseas holding company.  
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The rapid spread of EPZs in developing countries recent decades is characterised by 
poor labour standards by international criteria, although the higher wage earnings than 
in local domestic companies are clearly a positive incentive for local labour supply for 
the EPZ (ILO, 1998). While the most common response to increased competitive 
pressure is to increase the intensity of work and relate piece-rates to quality, there is 
some evidence of a gradual shift in the more technologically advanced sectors 
towards more modern management methods to enhance quality. However, the most 
recent OECD survey suggests that there is no robust evidence – with the possible 
exception of China – that foreign investors are attracted by low core labour standards 
as opposed to low unit labour costs, while they are likely to be attracted by the stable 




4. INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COORDINATION 
 
There is no doubt that the scope and spread of foreign investment incentives has 
increased considerably over the past two decades (UNCTAD 1996). Three issues have 
thus dominated recent debates on regulatory incentives to foreign investment in 
relation to labour and environment standards. First, the issue of a real or potential 
‘race to the bottom’ where host countries compete for foreign investment by lowering 
standards due to coordination failure leading to global welfare loss. Second, the issue 
of a real or potential ‘race to the top’ where investors apply higher standards than host 
countries and thus raise the overall level as part of global corporate strategy. Third, 
the issue of responsibilities of international firms under international law in the light 
of difficulties in establishing or implementing multilateral treaties in this field.   
 
It is a relatively uncontroversial proposition that host countries – particularly in non-
OECD countries - should not use the relaxation of labour and environmental standards 
in order to attract or retain foreign investment. The adoption of core labour standards 
depends in practice on legal systems and peer pressure as well as on income levels 
(Chau and Kanbur, 2001) while environmental standards appear to depend on 
institutional development as much as on income as such (Dasgupta, 2001).  
 
However, it is far from clear how to make these standards legally binding and subject 
to dispute settlement procedures. Many countries have already expressed concern 
about WTO intrusiveness into the affairs of sovereign governments, particularly in 
areas of environmental protection and health and safety. None the less, in both the US 
and to a lesser extent the EU, there is strong pressure from both domestic legislators 
and civil society groups to ensure that future trade agreements contain some form of 
safeguards in these areas.   In contrast, developing and transition countries are 
generally opposed to such initiatives, which would disadvantage their own firms 
(particularly the small and medium enterprises) and are determined to keep such 
safeguards out of multilateral negotiations.  
 
The possibility that states could strategically decrease environmental protection to 
attract new industries, setting off a ‘race to the bottom’, is analytically well founded in 
game theory (Wilson 1997). At the practical policy level, for instance, “one concern 
about trade and financial integration is that countries with relatively weak 
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stronger regulations, and that because of competitiveness concerns integration will 
inhibit the imposition of strong environmental regulations (‘regulatory chill’)” (World 
Bank 2001 p. 96). 
 
International agreements aimed at protecting the labour rights and the environment 
include the various protocols drawn up by UN organisations as well as regional trade 
arrangements. Specifically, both the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles 
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (Article 46) and the NAFTA 
(Article 1114) contain commitments on not lowering standards. However, although 
such commitments may bind governments, few have tried to enforce these 
undertakings on the private sector. OECD members have encouraged self-regulation 
by the private sector as a way of resolving this dilemma; and to forestall emerging 
demands from non-governmental organisations for mandatory regulation.  The 
potential damage to a firm’s reputation, the need to improve community relationships, 
and the prospect of more stringent government regulation can provide multinational 
companies with an incentive to adopt voluntary codes of conduct either individually 
or a part of a trade association (UNCTAD 1999).   
 
Constituencies mainly drive these ‘codes of corporate conduct’ in advanced (i.e. 
OECD member) economies. They are not considered to be a substitute for national 
legislation, but rather imply a level of treatment of labour and environment of a higher 
standard that that required by the host (transition or developing) country. This in turn 
would set an example to other companies – both domestic and foreign – in that 
country. These codes are supposed to be consistent with corporate profitability criteria 
because the resulting products will be more attractive to consumers (or at least not be 
actively avoided by them). This approach is thus conceptually distinct from the older 
tradition of improving social conditions in the workplace and immediate locality in 
order to improve labour productivity, reduce staff turnover, and ensure the support of 
local authorities.  
 
The practical impact that private regulation initiatives such as labelling schemes have 
on the market depends in practice upon the general level of issue awareness among 
consumers and investors, and their willingness to make respect for human rights, 
labour standards or environmental protection relevant criteria in their purchasing 
decision (FitzGerald 2000). There is thus a double problem for the firm: that of 
shifting consumer preference functions, and that of informing consumers about a 
particular firm or product. Consumer preferences in advanced economies do seem to 
be shifting towards ‘green’ products, and against those using ‘sweated labour’; and 
labelling does seem to have some impact, although activism by non-governmental 
organisations may be more effective in practice. However, in practice labelling poses 
the problem of ‘free riding’ by non-compliant companies, and thus the need to rely on 
trade associations to regulate their use – and in some cases even support from 
legislation, if only to protect consumers from misleading advertising.    
 
The traditional view - that multinational companies are only subject to the labour and 
environmental legislation of the country where the operations in question take place – 
is thus now felt to be inappropriate. It is to be assumed that most companies 
(particularly from OECD member countries) do comply with host legislation, even 
though they may exert lobbying pressure to have it changed to their advantage 
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case of property protection and market access. In consequence multinational firms are 
now encouraged to engage in “responsible business conduct” in the OECD Guidelines 
(OECD, 2000)
9 that “express the shared values of the governments of countries that 
are the source of most of the world’s direct investment flows and home to most 
multinational enterprises”, although the Guidelines “are not a substitute for, nor do 
they override, applicable law. They represent standards of behaviour supplemental to 
applicable law and, as such, do not create conflicting requirements”. Their voluntary 
nature
10 permits a gradual ‘buy-in’ process as countries bring them into national law 
(which may of course be binding on their companies overseas), which should 
gradually give them a substantive role in reducing potential abuse relating to 
incentives.  
 
In addition, multinational companies are increasingly becoming subject to cross-
border legislation independently of treaties on investor protection, labour standards 
and the environment, which all rely on (home or host country) domestic legislation to 
affect companies. First, trade treaties such as NAFTA contain environmental and 
labour obligations where companies and citizen groups can participate in the dispute 
settlement procedure (Neuiwenhuys and Brus, 2001). Second, there is an increasing 
willingness of courts in home countries to admit cases involving the activities in other 
(host) countries by subsidiaries of multinational corporations, brought by citizens of 
the host country or their representatives (Muchlinski, 1995). And third, there is an 
emerging notion among international human rights lawyers that companies can be 
held criminally responsible for abuses under international law in view of the obstacles 
to legal accountability at the national level (ICHRP, 2001). In this context, human 
rights established under international law are increasingly understood to extend to 
both labour and environmental conditions - particularly those relating to health and 
safety (UNECS, 2001). 
 
In consequence, there is a growing public awareness that some form of international 
coordination of regulatory standards has become necessary. In a world where the 
distribution of both ‘own’ multinational corporations and knowledge capital is highly 
unequal then regulatory competition logically leads to global welfare loss, with severe 
coordination failure costs if some countries refuse to join a coordination scheme or 
will only do so if all others do so as well (Turini and Urban, 2001). The welfare gains 
would be particularly significant for small or weak states whose domestic regulatory 
regimes are not credible or most subject to ‘negotiation’ by investors (FitzGerald, 
2001).  International coordination designed to strengthen institutional capacity as well 




4. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS  
 
This paper has attempted to show that economic analysis can shed some light on 
regulatory investment incentives if the heterogeneity of firms and countries are 
explicitly taken into account. Broadly speaking, ‘upward’ competition on property 
rights and market access is probably beneficial for OECD and non-OECD member 
countries alike (albeit less so for domestic firms in host countries); while ‘downward’ 
competition on environment and labour – is mainly a problem for non-OECD 
members – when it occurs probably leads to welfare losses. No case can be made for QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS80   Page 12 
   
different standards between large domestic firms and (large) foreign firms; although 
there are good arguments for preference to small firms due to their employment-
creation role. 
 
As this paper has shown, the empirical literature contains ambiguous results on the 
existence, effect and consequences of regulatory competition for foreign investment. 
Even though the empirical evidence on a regulatory ‘race to the bottom’ leads to no 
clear conclusion (Brown, 2000; UNCTAD, 2001a), there is no robust indication that 
measurable indicators on environmental or labour standards are negatively associated 
with investment inflows. However, there are two major problems with such studies. 
First, it is difficult to establish reliable indicators of the independent regulatory 
variables or of the dependent variable (foreign investment) itself on a cross-country 
basis.  Although some fragmentary data is available on variables such as wage levels 
and environmental quality, they do not directly reflect the strength of regulatory 
legislation or application.  The usual measure of ‘foreign direct investment’ is in fact 
not capital formation by multinational corporations but rather changes in equity stake 
that include acquisitions and exclude third-party finance. In particular, large 
privatisations in developing and transition countries, and mergers in industrial 
countries, have distorted the published FDI figures seriously during the past decade.   
 
Second, a significant problem of direction of causation is involved in these attempts at 
econometric measurement. It is clear that labour and environmental standards 
themselves rise with the level of economic development (Dasgupta, 2001; Chau and 
Kanbur, 2001) and this in turn is one of more significant explanatory variables in all 
empirical models of foreign investment. Thus a measured positive association 
between high regulatory standards and foreign investment cannot be used to negate 
the existence of a ‘race to the bottom’ (or assert a ‘race to the top’) unless careful 
correction is made for per capita income or market size. A case study approach to 
firms’ location decisions in specific instances of regulatory incentives should allow 
these two problems to be overcome. More research is also needed on the effect of 
regulatory uncertainty on investors - probably by careful surveys of investors and 
non-investors.
11 There is also a need to distinguish between the effects of incentives 
offered by different levels of government (e.g. central ministries versus regional 
authorities) and by semi-autonomous regulators themselves.  
 
However, the social costs of the lowering (or not raising sufficiently) standards in 
these sensitive areas imply that in the absence of hard evidence, the precautionary 
principle should be applied – that is, to positively avoid potential damage. On this 
principle, the table below summarises the policy areas where there is most reason to 
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  Levels of potential policy concern 
 
Issue  OECD members  Non-OECD members 








Negligible  Negligible  Some  Some 
Labour 
standards 
Negligible  Low  Some  High 
Environment  Negligible  Some  Some  High 
  
 
In sum, the difficulties inherent in the multilateral coordination of standards in 
relation to property protection, market access, labour standards and the environment 
beyond the most basic principles mean that recent progress in the related fields of 
global market regulation such as goods trade and financial regulation may be very 
difficult to follow. The heterogeneity of economies, firms and sectors has to be taken 
into account if rules-based systems are to be workable. In consequence, regional 
arrangements may well turn out to be more appropriate as they can allow for similar 
levels of development and institutional similarities better than a multilateral system – 
particularly for small or poor countries which are most at risk of modifying the 
regulatory standards they judge appropriate in order to compete for foreign 
investment with their neighbours.  
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NOTES 
                                                 
1  See OECD (2001)  Project on Policy Competition for FDI: Issues for Discussion Paris: OECD 
DAFFE/IME (2001) 20  
 
2  This paper is concerned with regulatory incentives rather than taxes and state aid; although there is 
overlap at the margin because a potential ‘subsidy’ exists when “a firm is said to be ‘favoured’ by 
reference to the situation faced by other firms in the industry. For example, a firm would be said to be 
benefited or favoured if it received a higher level of financial transfers, lower taxes, greater benefit 
from public goods or fewer environmental or regulatory controls than its competitors in the market” 
(OECD (2001) ‘Competition policy, subsidies and state aid’ DAFFE/CLP/WP2 (2001) 1) 
 
3 In sum “a government could choose a weaker-than-appropriate regulatory regime, effectively setting 
the price for the harm lower than the cost of the harm inflicted. Firms in that jurisdiction would then 
benefit from this implicit ‘subsidy’, in the same way that under-pricing of any input can constitute a 
form of subsidy” (OECD, op. cit.). 
 
4 This type of ‘supplier rationing’ is of course a general characteristic of capital markets and is caused 
by asymmetric information and agency costs. In domestic financial markets this leads to banks 
rationing credit (and funds limiting equity exposure) to firms – particularly those that are small or 
risky. 
 
5 Matched by a similar number of bilateral treaties to avoid double taxation (loc. cit.). 
  
6 In 2000, these changes were mainly to provide more guarantees (40%), more liberal entry and 
operational conditions (24%) and more sectoral liberalisation (19%); as opposed to those involving 
more controls (2%) or even more promotion, including incentives (16%). 
 
7 See OECD (2001) ‘Regulation of investment incentives: the impact of trade agreements’ TD/TC/WP 
(2001) 38. 
 
8 See also OECD (2001) ‘Environmental issues in policy-based competition for investment: a literature 
review’ ENV/EPOC/GSP (2001) 11. 
 
9 Specifically, the 2000 version of the Guidelines as compared to the previous (1976) version adds 
recommendations on the elimination of child labour and forced labour, so as to cover all internationally 
recognised core labour standards. The environmental section now encourages multinational enterprises 
to implement environmental management systems and provide for environmental impact contingencies. 
 
10 29 member countries and 4 non-members have adopted the Guidelines. 
 
11 Although many significant cases of relocation can be (and have been) identified, there is still a severe 
problem of selection bias if cases of firms that have not relocated are excluded (UNCTAD 2001a). 